more was needed to buttress it, for he appended four additional definitions-two, of terms that appear in the main definition; the other two, of concepts that are implicit in it:
An artist is a person who participates with understanding in the making of a work of art. A public is a set of persons the members of which are prepared in some degree to understand an object which is presented to them. The artworld is the totality of all artworld systems. An artworld system is a framework for the presentation of a work of art by an artist to an artworld public. [92] In his most recent book, Dickie maintains that the five definitions taken together "provide the leanest possible description of the institution of art and thus the leanest possible account of the institutional theory of art." 19 To us, they provide the leanest possible evidence of the utter emptiness of his theory, owing to its blatant circularity. They fail to tell us anything about the actual nature of art works or how they differ from other human artifacts.
Dickie acknowledges that his definitions of art are circular, but claims that they are not "viciously" (or fundamentally) so, for they constitute, in his view, "a logically circular set of terms" which are inflected, "bend[ing] in on, presuppos [ing] , and support[ing] one another," thus reflecting the "inflected nature of art." (92) "What the definitions reveal," Dickie explains, "is that art-making involves an intricate, co-relative structure that cannot be described in the straightforward, linear way envisaged by the ideal of noncircular definition." Furthermore, "the inflected nature of art is reflected in the way that we learn about art." Thus the poor reader who is lost in the opacity of all this prose can be taught "how to be a member of an artworld public"-"how to look at pictures that are presented as the intentional products of artists." (93) In the nearly three decades since Dickie first promulgated the institutional theory, it has been repeatedly discussed and revised by other philosophers. Yet the resulting "definitions" of art have retained the same fundamentally circular thrust: all of them imply, in effect, that virtually anything is art if a reputed artist or other purported expert says it is. Moreover, the basic assumptions of the institutional theory have persisted, even in the thought of philosophers who claim to reject it in whole or in part. In Art and Nonart (1983) , for example, Marcia Eaton pointed to "serious weaknesses" in Dickie's definition (though she nonetheless considered it "the most careful and clearest working out of such a definition"). (82) She subsequently offered her own version of what art is:
[Something] is a work of art if and only if . . . [it] is an artifact and . . . [it] is discussed in such a way that information concerning the history of [its] production . . . directs the viewer's attention to properties which are worth attending to.
20 [99] Note that Eaton's implied discussants, who direct our attention to properties of artifacts they deem "worth attending to," bear an uncanny resemblance to the "person or persons acting on behalf of . . . the artworld"-who anoint certain artifacts as "candidate [s] for appreciation"-in Dickie's original definition. Moreover, the determinative role of the "artworld" becomes even more obvious in the revised definition proposed by Eaton in Aesthetics and the Good Life (1989) . 21 Eaton strives to retain what she refers to as the "aesthetic value" of art. But her definition of this concept 22 sheds no light on the distinctive value of art, as compared with other "aesthetic" objects. In any case, Eaton accepts the institutional theory's basic premises. As Ralph Smith has observed, the discussion emphasized by Eaton enables "a thing that otherwise would not be regarded as art [to be inducted] into the world of art": thus such things as " [b] oulders, pieces of driftwod, or ditches" that "get talked about in relevant terms . . . in effect beco me w orks of art " acc ording t o Ea ton's t heory. 23 Another prominent philosopher, Richard Wollheim, promisingly begins a sometimes insightful critique of the institutional theory, in his book Painting as an Art, by noting the theory's "fundamental implausibility," and by further suggesting that revision does not reduce any of "the very serious difficulties that attach to it." That the theory is popular in some circles, he astutely remarks, derives from the enhanced power and enlarged self-esteem it imparts to those "tempted to think of themselves as representatives of the art-world." In their view, Wollheim observes, "[p]ainters make paintings, but it takes a representative of the art-world to make a work of art." (13) (14) Nonetheless, like Eaton, he ultimately embraces the fundamental assumptions of the institutional th eory.
Though Wollheim does not offer a definition of art (notwithstanding his concern with painting "as an art"), one need only read between the lines of his work to see that his concept is little removed in essence from those of Dickie and Eaton. "The experience of art," Wollheim explains, rather opaquely, "takes the form. . . of coming to see the work that causes the experience as in turn the effect of an intentional activity on the part of the artist." Further, the artist's intention involves, in part, his belief that when a particular intention is fulfilled in his work, then an adequately sensitive, adequately informed, spectator will tend to have experiences in front of the painting that will disclose this intention. [8, emphasis ours]
What is one to make of Wollheim's reference to "an adequately sensitive, adequately informed, spectator"? Imagine a poor, befuddled "spectator" standing before an abstract painting in a museum and confiding to Wollheim that he discerns only geometric forms, color, and texture which represent nothing. He therefore questions whether the work is, in fact, art. Wollheim would no doubt inform him that the work is actually "at once representational and abstract" (as he argues later in his book), and that it is indeed a work of art. When the hapless spectator, now "adequately informed," nonetheless fails to discern the alleged artist's "intention," and continues to doubt that the work is art, he would then be judged "inadequately sensitive"-according to
Wollheim's version of the "experience of art." In effect, Wollheim is a representative of the artworld he purports to disparage.
In Definitions of Art (1991), Stephen Davies remarks that Dickie's original proposition "struck some people as preposterous" (78)-owing, no doubt, to its obvious circularity. Yet all the succeeding approaches which Davies examines can be seen, when stripped of the obfuscating jargon in which they are often cast, to be nothing more than variations on the institutional theory. Indeed, after describing and commenting in detail on the definition of art "as it has been discussed in Anglo-American philosophy over the past thirty years," 24 Davies himself offers "not a new theory but rather a new perspective," culminating in the following conclusion:
Something's being a work of art is a matter of its having a particular status. This status is conferred by a member of the Artworld, usually an artist, who has the authority to confer the status in question by virtue of occupying a role within the Artworld to which that authority attaches. 25 [218]
How does Davies define the crucial concept "Artworld"? It is, he explains somewhat murkily, an "informal institution" arising from "(noninstitutional) social practices related to the function of art and . . . continu[ing] to develop through time," which is "structured in terms of its various roles-artist, impressario, public, performer, curator, critic, and so on-and the relationships among them." Of these many roles, 26 Davies defines only the first:
An artist is someone who has acquired (in some appropriate but informal fashion) the authority to confer art status. By "authority" I do not mean "a right to others' obedience"; I mean an "entitlement successfully to employ the conventions by which art status is conferred on objects/events." This authority is acquired through the artist's participation in the activities of the Artworld. 27 [87] Thus Davies's "new perspective" merely combines and reshuffles the elements of the two versions of Dickie's proposition for a result that, in our view, is equally nonsensical.
Regarding the purpose of art, and the question of why art plays "so significant a role in the lives of so many people" (50), Davies notes only that its "primary function . . . is to provide enjoyment." 28 Unlike Rand, he offers no suggestion of what might be the source of the pleasure derived from art. He notes only that the "wider social functions" art serves-"providing employment, securing the value of [financial] investments, and so on"-tend to influence the Artworld "to operate in a way that often is at odds with the function of art." With no further comment on his part, however, the reader is left to guess at his precise meaning. Most disturbing is the opinion of Robert Rosenblum-professor of art history at New York University's Institute of Fine Arts, and a curator at the Guggenheim Museum in New York City-who disdainfully presumes: "By now the idea of defining art is so remote I don't think anyone would dare do it." 31 Since Rosenblum surely knows of on-going attempts at an institutional "definition" by his peers in the artworld, he must mean that no one would dare to propose an essentialist definition, framed according to the rules of logic. As this book testifies, however, he is much mistaken. In any case, the pedagogical implications of Rosenblum's remark are disconcerting, for it is all too easy to imagine the intimidating influence his attitude might have on students inclined to even raise the question of an objective definition of art in the classes he teaches.
The "Appeal to Authority"
The institutional theory, in all its manifestations, resorts to the logical fallacy known as the "appeal to authority." 32 But the rules of logical argument demand that adequate evidence be given in support of a claim or theory. As Kelley points out in The Art of Reasoning, it is entirely appropriate to rely on expert testimony, provided that "the conditions of credibility are satisfied":
(1) the alleged authority must, in fact, be an expert in the field under discussion; and (2) he must be objective. Moreover: Contrary to the artworld's authoritarian "experts" cited above, we would insist that the general nature o f art is d ecidedly not a technical issue requiring specialized knowledge beyond the grasp of the ordinary person. 33 As Jacques Barzun has admonished: "Talk and thought about art must conform to the canons of common sense, because art offers itself to the senses and the mind not as an idea or an abstraction, but as a piece of concrete experience. Nor does common sense here mean conventional opinion but thought free of jargon."
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Since the institutional theory in all its forms depends on the "appeal to authority," we refer to it as the "authoritarian theory of art," a term that more accurately indicates its true nature, and to the various definitions subsumed under it as "authoritarian" definitions of art.
The Rules of Definition
Given the overwhelming trend away from essentialist, or analytical, definitions in contemporary philosophy, Rand deserves credit, at the outset, for insisting on the need for such a definition with respect to art. In so doing, she continued an established practice of inestimable value. The virtues of precise definition, and the rules governing its construction, had been a commonplace of intellectual discourse in the first half of the twentieth century.
As late as 1948, for example, the Encyclopedia Britannica carried a succinct entry on "definition," written from an essentialist perspective. Referring to definition as "a logical term used popularly for the process of explaining, or giving the meaning of, a word," the entry went on to cite a set of rules "generally given as governing accurate definition." 35 In his classic introductory text Logic (first published in 1950), Lionel Ruby observes that "when we speak of 'definition,' we usually refer to this type of definition" (99). He further notes that such a definition is valuable because it tells us that "something belongs to a general class of things and that it is distinguished from other members of its class by certain characteristics." (100-101) Ruby aptly begins his discussion with a trenchant bit of dialogue from Lady Windermere's Fan, by Oscar Wilde, in which the Duchess implores: "Do, as a concession to my poor wits, Lord Darlington, just explain to me what you really mean," and Darlington candidly replies: "I think I had better not, Duchess. Nowadays to be intelligible is to be found out." As Ruby explains: "When we define our terms we explain 'what we really mean,' with all the risks attendant thereto. But if we desire to avoid obfuscation and discussions which move at cross-purposes, we must give definite and precise meanings to our terms." (88)
Regarding the process of constructing a proper definition, Ruby acknowledges that it can be very difficult, "particularly when there is controversy over the 'proper' meaning of a word." (119) As it happens, one of the controversial concepts with which he chooses to illustrate the process is art, for it is precisely such "vague or ambiguous terms" that most require an analytical definition, which helps to clarify the objective nature of the concept's referents. (100) Kelley, too, discusses the definition of the concept art, emphasizing that "the more abstract a concept is, and the longer the chain of other concepts that link it to its referents, the more important a definition is." 37 (35)
In her Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Rand argues that, though a definition is often said to state the meaning of a word or term, it really identifies "the nature of the [referents] subsumed under a concept." She explains: "A word is merely a visual-auditory symbol used to represent a concept; a word has no meaning other than that of the concept it symbolizes, and the meaning of a concept consists of its [referents]. It is not words, but concepts that man defines-by specifying [the fundamental attributes of] their referents." The purpose of a definition, she emphasizes, is "to distinguish a concept from all other concepts and thus to keep its [referents] differentiated from all other existents." 38 (40) A useful definition can therefore be based only on a rational system of classification, 39 and one cannot merely "stipulate" (as Ruby might seem to suggest) the referents being defined. "When in doubt about the meaning or the definition of a concept," Rand counsels, one should seek the referents that "gave rise to the concept." 40 (51) In the case of art, this means pre-modernist works of painting, sculpture, literature, music, and dance. Since the process of concept-formation itself depends on a recognition of fundamental similarities and differences, 41 a re-examination of these original referents would yield more reliable information than a consideration of avant-garde work. Thus the approach taken by contemporary theorists, who focus on such phenomena as "dadaism, pop art, found art, and happenings," 42 is completely mistaken.
As outlined by both Ruby and Kelley, as well as by the brief Encyclopedia Britannica article cited above, a proper definition is constructed according to a prescribed set of principles, or rules, the most important of which are the following: (1) it includes a genus (the general class of things to which the referents of the concept being defined belong) and a differentia (the principal characteristic[s] distinguishing the concept's referents from other things in that class); (2) it is neither too broad nor too narrow; (3) it identifies the essential attributes or characteristics of the concept's referents; (4) it avoids circularity (it must not employ a synonym or cognate of the concept being defined); and (5) (1) Rand's definition does include a genus ("a selective re-creation of reality") and a differentia ("according to an artist's metaphysical value-judgments"). Further, the genus conveys, as it should, important i nformation about the larger class of things t o which art w orks belong. 44 As we suggested in Chapter 1, Rand's genus broadly corresponds to the concept of mimesis 45 (imitation) in ancient Greek thought. In our present-day context, Rand's concept of "selective recreation" subsumes a wide variety of man-made objects and activities, many of which are not works of art. Among the non-art examples are dolls, toy cars, model ships, billboard advertisements, magazine illustrations, children's play-acting, 46 and ce lebrity impe rsonations. In each instance of mimesis, the principal criterion for the selective re-creation of reality is suitability for the intended purpose, or function, of the object or activity. The designer of toy cars or dolls, for example, seeks to delight and instruct children. The billboard designer aims to catch the eye of people traveling at some speed on a highway and motivate them to purchase commercial goods or services, for example, or to support some cause. The celebrity impersonator's goal is to entertain an audience by mimicking the vocal and physical mannerisms of well-known personalities, often by exaggerating them as in a caricature.
The criterion of selectivity on the part of the artist is also dependent upon the ultimate function of the work-which is to objectify fundamental values and a view of life. In contrast with the individuals cited above, however, the artist need not be aware of that ultimate function at all, and surely not to the degree explicated by Rand. 47 Though it governs his choices, it does not necessarily form part of his conscious intention. Nor does the artist focus, during the creative process, on the work's relation to other people. His intentional focus is on the work itself, on its intrinsic importance for him, as we emphasized in our discussion of "communication" and art in Chapter 3. He is guided primarily by the standard of what he holds-on the deepest, emotionally integrated, subconscious level-to be important in life. 48 This is what Rand's differentia of "metaphysical value-judgments" is meant to convey, but the full meaning of that term and its relationship to art are far from transparent. On that issue, see (5) below.
(2) To test whether Rand's definition is too broad or too narrow, one must seek possible counterexamples: wo uld it i nclude som e th ings tha t ar e cl earl y not art? might it exclude anything that one would reasonably classify as art? To our knowledge, her definition subsumes all, and only, those works that commonly fall under the traditional category of ("fine") art-with the exception of architecture, the exclusion of which is justified, as we argue in Chapter 10. We can think of nothing whose status as art is undisputed that would be excluded by it. 49 The only works excluded are precisely those that have been regarded as "controversial" or "avant-garde" in the twentieth century-that is, those which have been arbitrarily granted art status by the "artworld." In our view, their exclusion is a major virtue of Rand's definition.
(3) Does the definition identify the essential attribute(s) or characteristic(s) of all works in the major art forms? As we have indicated in (1) and (2), we think that Rand's concept of a "selective re-creation of reality" does indeed identify a fundamental attribute of all authentic instances of art. Moreover, her criterion of selection "according to an artist's metaphysical value-judgments" (at least as it is elaborated by her in terms of her concept of sense of life) is valid, in our view, although we have reservations about the term as such-on which, again, see (5) below. Taken as a whole, Rand's definition accounts for the salient features of the rich diversity of art works in various cultures from prehistory onward, while also allowing ample possibility for future creativity-even as technology advances-within the limits set by the requirements of human nature. 50 It not only points to the distinctive attributes of art works but also suggests why art can be of profound personal significance for both creator and responder, as well as being culturally significant. In sum, it answers three of the principal objections commonly raised against an essentialist definition: first, that such a definition would foreclose creativity; second, that works of art share no perceptible common features; and third, that such a definition could not be a guide to distinguishing art from non-art.
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Nonetheless, the objection has been raised that Rand's definition is inadequate, because it fails to specify the function of art. 52 On the face of it, this may seem to be a legitimate objection, since human artifacts are usually defined in terms of their function, which determines their characteristics. 53 Rand herself emphasizes that a distinctive characteristic of art is that it serves a unique psychological function-that of concretizing or objectifying what one deems to be important in life. A persistent problem with attempting to define art in terms of its purpose, however, is that an art work often serves multiple purposes. While the cognitive function identified by Rand constitutes the ultimate purpose for which art exists, secondary functions may readily coexist with it. And, as we have stressed, the cognitive function of art does not ordinarily form part of an artist's conscious intention.
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According to Rand's definition, it matters little whether the conscious purpose or intention of a Renaissance painter depicting a Madonna and Child, for instance, was to pay homage to the Virgin, while satisfying his patron's wish to do the same, perhaps hoping thereby to insure intercession with God. As evidenced by the widely varying treatments of such religious subjects, a different artistic temperament shapes each one, and each work projects a distinctive sense of life. Nor do we need to kn ow whether D ante's motivation for writing The Divine Comedy, for example, was to save the souls of his fellow Christians. What counts is that, in every case, the individual sensibility of the artist is embodied in the work itself. Because Rand's definition identifies the essence of art works as such, without stipulating their function, it need not exclude those works intended or employed for ritual or religious purposes. 55 Regardless of the purposes for which such works may have been intended or enjoyed, they presented a selective re-creation of reality which held deep personal significance for the artist and for countless others as well, down to the pres ent day.
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In an y case , it is i mportant t o rem ember t hat a def inition ne ed n ot s peci fy all the important characteristics of the concept's referents, but should focus instead on those that have the greatest explanatory power. In our view, Rand's definition of art does this, notwithstanding any reservations we express below about the key term of the differentia.
(4) At first glance, the objection could be raised that Rand's differentia violates the rule of non-circularity, since it employs the term "artist," a cognate of the term or concept being defined. On closer examination, however, this objection evaporates. Rand's definition is not fundamentally circular, since one might easily substitute the term "maker" or "creator" without altering the essential meaning of the statement (though we much prefer the term "artist"). 57 In other words, one does not need to know what an "artist" is in order to understand what "art" is, according to Rand's definition. Authoritarian definitions of art, by contrast, are fundamentally circular. Their meaning ultimately depends on one's knowledge of what an "artist" or the "artworld" is, which in turn requires that one know what "art" is.
(5) Finally, we must consider whether Rand's definition is sufficiently clear, whether it avoids vagueness and obscurity. The key term of her differentia, "metaphysical value-judgments," might w ell be o bscure t o pe rsons n ot s teeped in p hilosophy. 58 As we noted in Chapter 1, her own discussion of the concept is cursory, and the examples she cites seem to have little relevance to art forms other than literature. Her fullest explication of metaphysical value-judgments as they pertain to the arts is in terms of sense of life, as we indicated in Chapters 2 and 3. Why, then, did she not use that concept in her definition?
The likely answer is that, while less obscure, the term "sense of life" would be far more vague, in the absence of Rand's explication and analysis. Though the phrase is often used in everyday discourse, no one unfamiliar with Rand's thought could be expected to be aware of the complex layers of meaning she ascribes to it, as "a pre-conceptual equivalent of metaphysics"-"an emotional, subconsciously integrated appraisal of man and of existence." In light of her analysis of sense of life and its role in art, however, it is clear that the term "metaphysical valuejudgments," without further modification, may be somewhat misleading as the criterion of artistic selectivity, since it can be taken as referring to conscious value-judgments, whereas "sense of life" refers to the subsconsciously held value-judgments that are crucial to emotional response.
In our previously published introduction to Rand When we proposed our revision of Rand's definition, we were unaware that she had originally employed the term "values"--though not "fundamental" or "basic" values--in her definition and had then replaced it with "metaphysical value-judgments." 56 In re-considering this point, one of us (M.M.K.) has had a change of mind. The other (L.T.) has not. We offer both our views below for our readers' consideration.
[M.M.K.] Certainly, the concepts of "values" and "metaphysical value-judgments," while related, are by no means equivalent for Rand. She defines a value as "that which one acts to gain and/or to keep," and implicit in that definition is the standard sense of that which one esteems as a good. In contrast, a metaphysical value-judgment might be defined (based on her analysis) as "an assessment of a fundamental aspect of reality in relation to its import for one's life." Whereas values pertain to everything that a man regards as a good (and therefore seeks to gain and to keep), 57 metaphysical value-judgments comprise both negative and positive assessments, since they pertain to fundamental aspects of existence-that which is deemed important, for better or for worse.
With respect to art, in particular, the concept of metaphysical value-judgments has broader relevan ce t han tha t of val ues alo ne. An a rtist w ho c hooses to d epict h uman su ffer ing a nd m isery, for example, cannot reasonably be supposed to be guided in the creative process by his fundamental values, if by "values" one means "that which he deems as a good." Rather, he is guid ed b y wha t he con siders to b e me taphysically important. Because he regards suffering as a salient and inescapable aspect of human existence, he makes it the subject of his art. The medieval painters who depicted the horrors of the plague in fourteenth-century Italy (or the patrons who commissioned such scenes), for instance, did not "value" the Black Death. But they deemed it to be an event of shattering importance, of which one must remain mindful, and therefore sought to give it concrete expression. Indeed, Rand herself stresses this criterion of importance in he r anal ysis of the ro le of s ense o f life in art , as we have p reviously no ted. In replacing "values" with "metaphysical value-judgments" in her definition of art, Rand [L.T.] In substituting "metaphysical value-judgments" for "values" in her definition of art, Rand may have realized that the term is, by her own account, far too inclusive, since it encompasses literal ly anything one acquires (or seeks to acquire), or stores or preserves in some manner-from seashells and ice cream to picture postcards and freedom. But the term value occurs repeatedly in Rand's thought on art, most often preceded by such qualifiers as "metaphysical," "deepest," "basic, or "fundamental," so it is worth examining further, especially in relation to the above-mentioned notion of its "being esteemed as a good."
As defined by Peter A. Angeles (Dictionary of Philosophy), "value" is, indeed, "that which is . . . 7. There is no relationship between "analytical," or essentialist, definitions and the "analytic" school of contemporary philosophy. Indeed, as noted below (n. 12), that school eschews the analytic approach to definition.
8. Regarding essentialist approaches to defining art based on "expression," see our discussion of "Emotion and 'Expression' in Art" in Chapter 3. As Davies notes (Definitions, 22), it was, in particular, the effort to define art in terms of "certain aesthetic properties, such as beauty," that anti-essentialists rejected. Since beauty is neither a necessary nor a sufficient attribute of art works, it should never have been the focus of a definition. As Davies explains, rather than continue the search for a valid essentialist criterion, philosophers adopted a "contextualist" approach, attempting to define art in relation either to its social function or to the "procedures" by which art works are brought into being. The "procedural" definitions to which Davies refers, however, bear no similarity to the creative process implied in Rand's definition; his prime example of a procedural definition pertains to the "institutional theory" of art, which we discuss later in this chapter.
consider Rand's original definition of art (and either of our reformulations of it) preferable to any other definition we know of in the critical literature. 18. Dickie, The Art Circle (1984), 80-82; cited in his Introduction to Aesthetics, 92. As implied in n. 17, above, the term "artworld public" does not refer to the public at large, but to a relatively small segment of it whose members are knowledgeable about, and receptive to, "avant-garde" contemporary work and the theories supporting it.
19. A review of Dickie's Introduction to Aesthetics, in the Newsletter of the American Society for Aesthetics (Spring 1998), makes the mistake of quoting the later version of his definition without comment, while omitting the four supporting definitions he himself treats as, in effect, integral to it. The reviewer, Sarah Worth (co-editor of the ASA Newsletter), recommends the book, reporting that she has used it in an introductory esthetics course.
20.
We will not attempt to analyze here Eaton's broader theory of art, which includes her definition, for to do so would take us too far afield.
21. In Eaton's 1989 version, the work must be "discussed in such a way that information about [it] directs the viewer's attention to features that are considered worthy of attending to in aesthetic traditions (history, criticism, theory)." Quoted in Ralph A. Smith, Excellence II, 69. More recently, Eaton has replaced "discussed" with "treated" because, as she explains, colleagues pointed out that her emphasis on discussion was appropriate only to "Eurocentric art." "Reply to Symposiasts," Journal of Aesthetic Education, Summer 1995, 29. We would offer a different criticism, however, arguing that Eaton's definition, like all versions of the institutional theory, is mistakenly predicated upon the spurious art of the twentieth-century avant-garde.
22. According to Eaton, "aesthetic value is the value a thing or event has [owing] to its capacity to evoke pleasure that is recognized as arising from features in the object traditionally considered worthy of attention and reflection." Quoted by Smith, in Excellence II, 69. Eaton's phrase "traditionally considered" alludes, as Smith suggests, to the sort of critical and theoretical discussions o f art tha t li e at the cent er of the ins titutional th eory.
23. Smith, Excellence II, 70.
24. Davies views the debate over the definition of art as a conflict between "functional" and "procedural" accounts of the nature of art. On "procedural" approaches, see above, n. 6. Davies leans toward a procedural approach, which is characteristic of the institutional theory. Definitions, 22.
25. Incredibly, Davies concludes: "Had the Artworld never arisen, there never would have been any artworks." Definitions, 219. Contrast that view, all too commonly held, with Tatarkiewicz's observation: "Art exists not only where its name is to be found, where its concept has been developed and where there is a ready theory. These were not present in the caves at Lascaux, yet works of art were created there. Even were the concept and the institution of art to perish in obedience to certain avant-garde precepts, we may still suppose that people would go on singing and wittli ng [sic] figures in wood, imitating what they see, constructing forms and giving symbolic expression to their feelings." Six Ideas, 49.
26. Other groups subsumed by the term "artworld" include philosophers of art, administrators, dealers, collectors, and art historians. See, for example, Wollheim, Painting as an Art, 13; and below, n. 31. Only those individuals within these groups who are receptive to avant-garde work and theories would be bona fide "artworld" members, however. The absurd pretentiousness of this term is apparent when one considers that nothing comparable exists in any other sphere of human activity. On this point, see Dipert, Artifacts, 110.
27. As just one example of the countless individuals, worldwide, who today hold, and act on, the belief that they have the "authority" to "confer art status" on virtually anything-consider Christine Hill, who declares that the used clothing store she created on a side street in an old neighborhood in the former East Berlin "is being perceived as art, 40. With respect to the original referents of the term art, it is important to recognize that the idea of skill is fundamental to the root concept of art, in its widest sense, which derives from the Latin ars, the equivalent of the Greek term technê, meaning "craft, technique." For Aristotle and other Greek writers, the "mimetic arts" (corresponding to the modern "fine arts") are among the diverse products of human technê-that is, of practical, productive skill requiring the application of systematic knowledge. According to Aristotle's conception, the mimetic arts inevitably involve technê. This root meaning persists in the background of modern-day discussions of art, though the "artworld" often ignores it in the indiscriminate granting of art status to works involving little or no skill. When someone objects that something isn't art, because "anyone could do it," the notion of skill is clearly implicit. As novelist and critic Anthony Burgess observed: "Art begins with craft, and there is no art until craft has been mastered. 44. Note that while Rand's definition refers to "art" in the sense of art works-that is, the artistic products, not the process or activity-it also implies the essential nature of the creative process.
45. On the concept of mimesis in Greek thought, see the highly illuminating analysis in Halliwell, Aristotle's Poetics, 109-137; and his subsequent article, cited below, n. 46. Rand's genus is far more i nformative than t hat Di ckie's ins titutional def inition-"an art ifact." In specifying art works as a particular kind of mimesis, moreover, Rand's definition answers a major objection raised by Dickie("Definition of 'art,'" 109-10): he notes that the idea of art as imitation (mimesis), which persisted for 2,000 years after Plato, "flouts the traditional approach [to defi nition] by s peci fying onl y one condition rather than two," and thus implies that all imitations are works of art. Rand supplied the missing differentia.
46. As Halliwell notes, Aristotle Poetics 1448b4-9 (on "the instinct of imitation . . . implanted in man from childhood") seems to view the play-acting of children as an example of non-artistic mimesis. "Aristotelian Mimesis Reevaluated," Journal of the History of Philosophy 28 (1990): 490n5.
47. Dipert, too, argues that the ultimate function of art is less apt to be held in conscious awareness than is the function of other artifacts, especially practical ones. Artifacts, 111.
48. As we noted in Chapter 3, the precise manner in which a given artist concretizes what he deems important may be influenced to a large degree by the expressive and stylistic conventions of his time and place; but this does not alter the fact that it is his view which he projects in his work.
49. Note that Rand's term "re-creation" is general enough to encompass the diverse arts, whereas a term such as "embodiment," say, could not apply to all art forms, since its implication of physicality would exclude literature and music. Dickie, however, argues that some works of art "are not imitations in any way," citing as examples "many pieces of instrumental music and non-objective paintings." Contrary to his view, we have argued (Chapter 5) that all music is fundamentally mimetic. For our arguments against regarding nonobjective (wholly abstract) paintings as art, see Chapter 8.
50. In contrast with contemporary theorists such as Weitz and Dickie, Rand clearly holds that artistic "creativity" is delimited by the perceptual, cognitive, and emotional requirements of human nature. We explore some of those requirements in Chapter 7. Responding to Weitz's argument that an essentialist definition would foreclose creativity, Dickie sanguinely considers that "this danger is now a thing of the past." Introduction to Aesthetics, 85-86. For an instance of the sort of "creativity" Dickie's theory helps to legitimize, see above n. 27; for other examples, see ou r Intro duction and Part II.
51. On the basic objections to essentialist definitions, see Davies, Definitions, 6, 8, 15, 20, and 21. One obvious problem was the assumption that the diverse forms of art could share directly perceptible properties. Rand's definition is framed at a sufficiently abstract level to avoid this problem.
52. See Merrill, Ideas of Ayn Rand, 125; and our discussion in Kamhi and Torres, "Critical Neglect."
53. As David Kelley observes, "the essential attribute of a man-made object is usually its function. Such objects are created to serve a purpose, and the purpose explains why they are designed the way they are." Art of Reasoning, 21. Unfortunately, he comments no further, and cites no particular exceptions to the general rule.
54. Historically, functional definitions of art have been flawed, because they have incorrectly identified the ultimate purpose of art. Lacking the understanding of art's cognitive function that Rand provides, theorists have proposed definitions based on various misconceptions. Perhaps the most common of these (at least since the eighteenth century) is the idea that art is created solely for the "pleasure of contemplation"-in other words, that the primary function of art is to give pleasure. In contrast with Rand's theory, such accounts offer no adequate explanation regarding the source of that pleasure.
55. As Hanfling notes ( "The Problem of Definition," in Philosophical Aesthetics, 27), for example, Kennick (see above, n. 4) cites ancient Egyptian funerary art, intended to provide magical benefits for the deceased, as evidence that the attempt to define art in terms of function is "doomed."
56. The enduring appeal of work from past centuries and distant cultures is potent testimony that true art often transcends the specific circumstances of its origins.
